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ABSTRACT
Governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) are critical
functions within companies—this much we know. Yet business leaders
remain largely unsure of how to manage these functions effectively. The
evidence is both anecdotal, as seen by recent corporate scandals, and
research-based, as business law scholars levy sustained critiques against
corporate compliance and governance effectiveness. At least part of the
failing of GRC stems from its lack of coherent theory; there has been little
attempt to harmonize the various GRC functions and determine what is at
their core. Instead, the business and academic community has been content
with the simple acknowledgment that GRC contains both overlaps and
differences among its components. This Article offers a more principled
analysis. It argues that governance, risk management, and compliance can
best be understood through a behavioral ethics risk paradigm. Using
behavioral ethics, criminological, and network theory, the Article explains
that individual unethical decision-making within the firm is at the heart of
“conduct risk,” which in turn is at the core of GRC. When conduct risk is
misunderstood and ignored, as is the case in most companies, it not only
creates corporate compliance lapses, but it may also cause systemic risk
that can swamp corporate governance. Once this dynamic is understood,
effective GRC can be properly seen as an exercise in managing behavioral
ethics risk within the firm. After providing the necessary theoretical
framework, the Article turns to the practical, offering strategies companies
can use to identify and mitigate this newly understood risk.
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INTRODUCTION
The story is horrific. In December 2018, a 29-year-old female patient
of a long-term care facility operated by Hacienda HealthCare in Phoenix
gave birth to a child despite being in a vegetative state for the past fourteen
years.1 A few weeks later, based on DNA evidence, a male nurse was
arrested and charged with sexual assault and abuse of a vulnerable adult.2
Although the case is ongoing and the nurse has pleaded not guilty, there
can be no doubt that a serious criminal assault was committed against the
patient, almost assuredly by a Hacienda employee.
While the terrible nature of a story such as this is difficult to
comprehend, it nonetheless might be viewed, and possibly dismissed, as an
isolated act of depravity by a disturbed individual. Indeed, Hacienda issued
a statement soon after the nurse’s arrest, saying it would “accept nothing
less than a full accounting of this absolutely horrifying situation, an
1. Amelia McDonell-Parry, Woman in 14-Year Coma Gives Birth in Arizona, Rolling
Stone (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:54 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/coma-bi
rth-woman-arisona-hacienda-healthcare-776902/ [https://perma.cc/786V-FXT3].
2. Id.; Terry Tang, Lawyer: No Proof Nurse Raped Arizona Patient Who Had Baby,
Associated Press (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/2c385edbbf8147cdafee5cbb4cd
b3bb8 [https://perma.cc/UA7G-8B3F].
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unprecedented case” of employee wrongdoing.3 While on one level, that is
undoubtedly true—it is a horrifying situation, and one that is unprecedented
in most companies, even those in the healthcare industry. But on another
level, the case exemplifies something incredibly common in corporate
America: an employee commits an unethical or criminal act at work,
which triggers an investigation into that act, ultimately calling into question
the governance of the entire organization.
What happened at Hacienda after the nurse’s arrest demonstrates the
point. A special investigator was hired by the company to determine what
occurred.4 Such an investigation would include whether background
checks were conducted on the nurse and others interacting with the patient,
how her caretakers seemingly missed that she was pregnant for nine
months, and whether there was additional wrongdoing by staff or
management.5 Answering these questions is critical not only for this
patient, but also for the broader compliance and risk management functions
at Hacienda.6
However, the special investigator was not able to get the answers he
sought. Only a few weeks after beginning the investigation, he abruptly
resigned, citing “intolerable working conditions” that “complicated [his
team’s] ability to be successful.”7 He was not speaking of the entire
company, only Hacienda’s board of directors. The special investigator told
local news outlets that management was “working really hard” and trying
to “do the right thing” to further the investigation, but that certain board
members had not allowed him to do his job effectively.8
The special investigator’s resignation was only the beginning. A day
later, “all hell broke loose” at the company.9 Hacienda’s new CEO, who
3. Alanna Vagianos, Health Facility CEO Resigns After Woman In Vegetative State
Raped Multiple Times, HuffPost (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/h
acienda-healthcare-vegetative-birth-rape-ceo-resigns_us_5c34dde2e4b05d4e96bd1e15?ncid
=tweetlnkushpmg00000024 [https://perma.cc/VZ22-SMDC].
4. Matt Kelly, Governance Nightmare in Arizona, Radical Compliance (Mar. 3, 2019),
http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2019/03/03/governance-nightmare-arizona-hacienda/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/DC5Y-6Z9N] (explaining that the special investigator was a former Maricopa
County prosecutor).
5. Id.
6. Cf. Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1215, 1222–24 (2017) [hereinafter, Criminalization] (discussing the three spheres of
compliance programs—education, monitoring, and enforcement—which are especially
relevant in the highly regulated field of healthcare).
7. Robert Anglen & Stephanie Innes, Patient Rape Case: Investigator Quits, Says
Hacienda Board Stymied Him, AZCENTRAL, (Mar. 1, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.azcentral
.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2019/03/01/9-hacienda-healthcare-managers-q
uit-rick-romley-ends-investigation/3028617002/ [https://perma.cc/MR6C-GFLM].
8. Id.
9. Id.
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had just come into the position after the prior CEO was ousted because of
the patient assault, resigned in protest. The COO, as well as the director of
patient services, followed.10 But before their resignations could be
accepted, Hacienda’s chairman of the board, aided by another board
member, fired all three and had them escorted out of the offices by police.11
This set off another wave of resignations, including a board member and
five senior executives. Among those was the director of corporate
compliance, who would have been integral to ensuring that compliance
improvements suggested by the special investigator were implemented.
Finally, the chairman stepped down, ending his 38-year term on Hacienda’s
board.12
Subsequent investigations indicate that the chairman and other board
members had been engaging in self-dealing and nepotism for years.13
Additionally, the CEO who had left initially is now facing allegations that
he sexually harassed employees.14 The Arizona Attorney General’s Office
has stepped in, launching a wide-ranging “investigation into patient care,
financial fraud, and sexual-harassment claims” at the company.15 Although
state officials have taken over the Phoenix facility to prevent it from
closing, it is unclear whether Hacienda, which “also operates two for-profit
companies that sell medical equipment and provide home-health care,” as
well as multiple nonprofit children’s hospitals, group homes, and
immunization clinics, will survive.16 In roughly two months, the company
went from running multiple well-respected care facilities to being on the
verge of closing. All beginning with the terrible act of a single employee.17
* * *
With time, the question of what exactly happened at Hacienda
HealthCare will likely be answered, providing some small measure of
justice for the assaulted patient and her family. As soon as that occurs,
however, another equally important question will arise: how can Hacienda
prevent something like this from happening again?
This question is critical whenever a company faces scandal, be it from
governance failures or isolated employee wrongdoing. In fact, if
10. Id.
11. Anglen & Innes, supra note 7; Kelly, supra note 4.
12. Kelly, supra note 4.
13. See Anglen & Innes, supra note 7 (reporting that “Pomeroy brokered health
insurance for roughly 800 Hacienda employees through his private company, reaping
lucrative commissions”).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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generalized, the question is one that business leaders, not to mention
corporate governance scholars, have been asking for quite some time—how
can companies prevent bad acts by their employees? Unfortunately, the
answers given so far have been less than satisfying.18 Indeed, whole areas
of corporate law and strategy are aimed at the general topic of preventing
wrongdoing and governance failures, and at least three overlapping
corporate functions—governance, risk management, and compliance
(GRC)—consider it directly. These functions continue to gain prominence
in today’s world, which seems besieged by corporate scandal.19
That GRC is becoming more prominent is a good thing. After all, the
goals of GRC’s constituent parts are laudable. Risk management is aimed
at identifying, analyzing, and planning for various risks the company faces,
all with the intention of mitigating them so business can function more
effectively. The goal of compliance is to make sure the company and its
agents are following applicable laws and norms. The two functions overlap
in substance and form: non-compliance, either by an individual employee
or at the organizational level, creates risk; and both compliance and risk
can be managed by organizational governance processes. Thus, a company
that puts in place processes to lessen compliance failures will consequently
lesson its “conduct risk,” which ultimately leads to more effective
governance of the entire organization.20 Hacienda offers a dramatic
example of what happens when failure occurs at all three levels of GRC;
virtually every stakeholder—patients, employees, managers, investors, and
the larger community—is harmed.
But saying that failures of governance, risk management, and
compliance are important, or even terrible, only goes so far. What
corporate leaders are trying to figure out is what to do going forward—how
do they manage the GRC functions effectively and proactively to prevent
18. See, e.g., Amit S. Mukherjee, Why We’re Seeing So Many Corporate Scandals,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/why-were-seeing-so-many-corpor
ate-scandals [https://perma.cc/PQQ2-V3T6] (suggesting that corporations can avoid
scandals through “more attention to both institutional norms and ethical leadership”).
19. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 1 (2014) (describing the corporate functions of governance, risk management,
and compliance as “in vogue”).
20. See Tom Butler, et al., A Systematic Approach for Managing and Supervising
Conduct Culture and Risk 2–3 (Governance, Risk, & Compliance Tech. Ctr., 2017), https://e
9a5d5c6.stackpathcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/GR3C-Conduct-Risk-2017-_-Final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NZU2-WUQ5] (outlining ways to manage conduct risk); see also
Deloitte, Conduct Risk: Improving Culture Across the Enterprise, WALL ST. J. (May 14,
2018, 12:01 AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/05/14/conduct-risk-impr
oving-culture-across-the-enterprise/ [https://perma.cc/XB4T-QLBD] (defining conduct risk
as “unethical business practices, individual behaviors, and organizational behaviors that
have led to outcomes that have harmed either individual players or the financial system”).
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future failures? That is the truly vexing question facing diligent
companies.
But here too there has been a decided lack of answers. For decades,
we have been trying to determine “what works and what hurts” in corporate
governance without much resolution.21 Reasons for this are many, but the
fact remains that GRC’s increased importance has not resulted in a
corresponding increase in its efficacy. This has been lamented in both
corporate and academic circles.22 All agree that we have more, and more
sophisticated, corporate tools and metrics these days, yet we remain unclear
on how to use them to improve the governance of our organizations.
With that in mind, this Article suggests a new theoretical construct for
GRC, one organized around the concept of behavioral ethics risk
management. This approach, which works inside-out from compliance to
governance, offers a better way to understand the risks associated with
compliance failures like those occurring at Hacienda and how to combat
them to improve corporate governance. What this paradigm does better
than existing notions of GRC is focus on what is at the heart of these
related functions: individual ethical decision-making. Drawing from the
fields of behavioral ethics, criminology, and network theory, this Article
will explain how individual unethical decisions are made, how that leads to
compliance failures, and how those failures may spread conduct risk
throughout a company.23 This discussion will highlight how risk emanating
from unethical employee decision-making, if left unaddressed, may result
in significant, even catastrophic, risk to the firm—either by creating or
amplifying it. Often this is risk companies do not see, and therefore cannot
proactively seek to mitigate.
Once this newly understood risk is identified and explored, the Article
turns to how it should be addressed. A series of risk assessment and
compliance strategies are offered, ones that focus on the decision-making
21. See Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What
Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 132 (1999) (exploring the efficacy of
deterrence-based compliance programs in Fortune 1000 firms).
22. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491, 510–15 (2003) (arguing that “a
growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not deter
prohibited conduct within firms” and finding little support for their inclusion as a central
feature of negotiated governance).
23. The paradigm argued for in this Article follows from my work on corporate
compliance and behavioral ethics. See, e.g., Criminalization, supra note 6 (conceptualizing
corporate compliance as a mirror of criminal law principles); Todd Haugh, Nudging
Corporate Compliance, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 683 (2017) (analyzing ways in which companies
can nudge employees into certain behaviors); Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Corporate
Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129 (2018) (analyzing certain failures in corporate
compliance).
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processes of individuals, as opposed to the broadly distributed, command-
and-control type tools of traditional corporate compliance and governance.
The idea is to avoid the trap of blindly following current “best practices,”
which are often misguided, and instead target the true precursors to
corporate wrongdoing: individual unethical decision-making. By
employing these strategies, companies may reduce their conduct risk and
allow for more efficient and effective operations, which is the overarching
goal of all companies’ GRC efforts. It is also the only way to answer the
important questions posed above.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores, through a largely
theoretical lens, how the related functions of GRC may be harmonized in
the context of employee conduct. What becomes clear is that GRC
effectiveness is a product of understanding employee ethical decision-
making. Such decision-making is not binary—i.e., only good or evil—nor
is it normally distributed across the company in a way that could create
predictable conduct that is easily managed. Instead, it is driven by complex
individual and social psychology that is best thought of as dynamic
behavioral risk. Part II takes this insight and attempts to operationalize it.
Using the Hacienda Healthcare case as a backdrop, examples of behavioral
risk mitigation strategies that may be used throughout the life cycle of an
employee are offered. Some are straightforward, others are controversial,
but all have a common focus on identifying and fostering positive ethical
decision-making within a firm. This is the best way to achieve sustainable
gains in GRC and prevent wrongdoing at companies that may lead to
catastrophic harm.
I. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS RISK: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT SPREADS
The trend in scholarship analyzing GRC is to focus on its legal
foundations or its implications for managers.24 However, this approach
skips an important step. Before getting to how GRC operates or how it can
be maximized, one must consider what exactly it is—what it is made up of.
A. GRC and Its Ethical Decision-Making Core
To determine what GRC is, it is helpful to consider the relationship
between its component parts. As others have pointed out, the functions of
corporate governance, risk management, and compliance are distinct within
corporations, yet they clearly overlap.25 While this suggests a type of Venn
24. See MILLER, supra note 19, at 3 (describing the different areas of law that GRC is
comprised of).
25. Id. at 3.
 )) +)2)5%00< 5%1-2+ % 85436) *35 35435%7) %:
6845%
 (
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Moving one level down, risk management is the “processes by which
risk is identified, analyzed, included in strategic planning, and either
reduced through risk mitigation tactics or accepted as inherent in activities
that the organization wishes to conduct.”29 That is a way of saying that
companies have to manage uncertainty. While risk management has
become particularly complex these days, especially when firms attempt to
model the systemic risk they face, it is enough for our purposes to think of
risk management as the corporate function that tries to plan for the inherent
uncertainty that occurs when organizations make decisions.30 Those
decisions range from long term strategic planning, to short term financial
decisions, to managing personnel. Here, we will focus not so much on
external risk created by competitors or changing markets, but on the risk
emanating internally from employee actions—conduct risk.
The innermost circle is compliance. Although definitions vary, most
commentators agree that “‘[c]ompliance’ is a system of policies and
controls that organizations adopt to deter violations of law and to assure
external authorities that they are taking steps to deter violations of law.”31
Put more succinctly, compliance is a set of processes companies use to
ensure that employees “do not violate applicable rules, regulations or
norms.”32 And if placed more directly in the context of GRC, corporate
compliance can be defined as the processes by which a company polices its
own behavior to ensure conformity with laws and norms.33
Because compliance is near the core of GRC efforts, it is important to
go beyond a simple definition and understand what the function entails.
Corporate compliance has two primary purposes. The first is deterring
violations of criminal and civil law. On the criminal side, compliance is
aimed at preventing violations of state and federal law, as well as quasi-
criminal regulatory violations (i.e., regulations that can be criminally
enforced).34 In addition, compliance programs attempt to prevent
violations of purely civil law, such as torts like harassment and
29. MILLER, supra note 19, at 2; see also Plain English Definitions, ISO 31000 2018, htt
p://www.praxiom.com/iso-31000-terms.htm [https://perma.cc/5YWM-YA9Y] (defining risk
can as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives,” with an “effect” being “a positive or
negative deviation from what is expected”).
30. Id.
31. Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958
(2009).
32. Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview 1 (Nov. 18, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2527621 [htt
ps://perma.cc/3YC3-9556].
33. MILLER, supra note 19, at 3.
34. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2082 (2016) (discussing how firms change their behavior based on
compliance constraints).
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discrimination among employees.35 Put these together, and compliance
programs are attempting to deter unlawful employee behavior, which
reduces the risk that the company will be held responsible pursuant to
respondeat superior legal liability.36
The second purpose of compliance is to generate positive norms
within the company. Norm generation and enforcement—basically,
following the internal rules of the organization—is often considered the
“ethical culture” aspect of a company. Creating an ethical culture is often
seen as the overarching goal of many companies’ compliance initiatives.37
Positive organizational culture and norms that go with it are important
because they fill the gaps left by legal rules.38 There simply are not laws
governing every action one takes in a company, nor would we want that;
positive norms help guide good conduct in the interstices. The hope being
that through ethics and compliance programming employees will come to
share a common belief about the company’s “purpose (i.e., mission,
strategy, and goals), [and] the necessary means to achieve it (i.e., systems,
structure, and processes),” so that norms govern behavior and external legal
incentives need not be triggered.39
In order to achieve these two purposes, compliance must
simultaneously operate on multiple levels. Education and training, the first
level, is essentially policy-setting by the company to its employees.40 The
company explains what the applicable laws and corporate rules are and
how employees should comply with them. Monitoring, the second level,
ensures that those rules are understood and followed, and that any
violations are quickly identified and reported.41 Monitoring can be direct,
35. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary
Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 467 (2008)
(explaining the role of compliance to enforce sexual harassment and anti-discrimination
laws).
36. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1570–74 (1990) (describing how corporate criminal liability is based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior).
37. Griffith, supra note 34, at 2093–94 n.73.
38. Baer, supra note 31, at 960.
39. CATERINA BULGARELLA, SAI GLOBAL, PREDICTING RISK: A STRATEGIC CULTURE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE C-SUITE, SAI Global 10 (2018), https://m.comms.saiglobal.com/res/sa
iglob_mkt_prod1/SAI_Global_Strategic_Culture_Framework_Report_April2018.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/CS99-NQQC].
40. James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the
Legal Academy, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 9 (2013) (describing the policy-setting
aspect of compliance as the advising function of compliance); see also Griffith, supra note
34, at 2093 (explaining that the first core element of compliance is the customization of
policies and procedures to the company).
41. Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
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through initial employee screenings and performance reviews, or indirect,
through audits, hotline reports, and whistleblowing.42 Enforcement, the
third level, attempts to deter future violations by punishing wrongdoers.43
Often this means a reprimand, but termination is common for many
transgressions.44 When laws are broken, a range of more serious sanctions
for both the individual and the company are on the table.45 These types of
compliance violations in particular create significant conduct risk for
firms.46
Through this discussion, it should be obvious that much of
compliance—and therefore much of risk management and corporate
governance according to our concentric structure—turns on individual
employee behavior. If the individual agents of a firm act in a law-abiding
and ethical manner, the company will likely avoid legal liability and
compliance-related disruption of its business practices. This results in less
conduct risk, positive governance, and ultimately a strong corporate culture
of following the law and prosocial business norms.
Accordingly, companies’ intent on creating effective GRC regimes
must, at least in part, develop the “skill [of] predicting human behavior.”47
That behavior is predicated on individual decision-making, and more
specific to our concerns, ethical decision-making. Thus, the core of
compliance, and in turn much of GRC, is dependent on individual ethical
decision-making. This is the sphere at the center of Figure 1 that completes
the GRC relationship.
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 81 (2002).
42. Id. at 81–82.
43. Griffith, supra note 34, at 2099 (stating that “for a compliance function to be
effective, it must enforce the rules”).
44. Id. at 2097.
45. See Criminalization, supra note 6, at 1224 (stating that “[f]or serious wrongdoing,
the threat of termination is just the beginning; cooperation by the company with a regulatory
agency exposes employees to formal censure, fines, debarment, and even prison”).
46. For example, Siemens A.G. reported spending more than $1 billion solely related to
the government’s inquiry into the payment of foreign bribes by individual executives. The
reputational and operational costs were much higher. See Peter J. Henning, The Mounting
Costs of Internal Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/20
12/03/05/the-mounting-costs-of-internal-investigations/?r=0 [https://perma.cc/7Q5T-ZVX5]
(reporting on the foreign bribe scandal).
47. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 263 (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
2016).
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B. Individual Ethical Decision-Making and Behavioral Ethics
For many corporate leaders, considering GRC in this way—with the
ethical decision-making of employees at its core—will be eye-opening.48
Many business people think that governance, risk management, and
compliance comes solely from board level leadership, or from an active
general counsel. If you have good, strong leadership in these areas, you
will have a good company. While leadership certainly helps, it leaves out
the realities of how human beings—officers and lower-level employees
alike—make decisions with an ethical component.
Even for those organizations that have come around to the view that
firm governance is more than just leadership, there is often little
understanding of how employees make ethical decisions, and even less
understanding of how to incorporate that information into GRC practices.
Luckily, the field of behavioral ethics provides significant insights, laying
the foundation for the behavioral ethics risk management paradigm
outlined below.
1. The Behavioral Ethics Field and its Central Findings
The starting point for understanding ethical decision-making, then, is
the field of behavioral ethics. The easiest way to explain the field is
through a sound bite: it is the study of why “good people will do bad
things.”49 While that is true, the statement’s pithiness is its downfall; it
papers over too much sophisticated research developed over the past
twenty years. Unfortunately, there is no accepted comprehensive definition
of the field to draw upon. Instead, we have to couple together a few
different characterizations to understand behavioral ethics’ critical features.
Early proponents of the field described it as the “scientific approach
for studying perceptions of how we ought to treat one another . . . and how
such perceptions influence behavior.”50 That explanation was useful
because it made clear that ethical behavior could be studied systematically.
But it also lacked practicality. Thus, some responded by defining the field
as having the “aim[] [of] understand[ing] how even well-intentioned people
can sometimes behave unethically.”51 Going a step farther, and more
48. The same could be said for some legal and business academics, too.
49. Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Ethics: Can It Help Lawyers (and Others) Be Their
Best Selves?, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 35, 36 (2015).
50. Robert Folger, Deonance: Behavioral Ethics and Moral Obligation, in BEHAVIORAL
BUSINESS ETHICS 123, 125 (David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2012).
51. Jason Dana et al., Ethical Immunity: How People Violate Their Own Moral
Standards Without Feeling They Are Doing So, in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS 201, 202
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closely linking behavior and decision-making, behavioral ethics was called
a study of the “systematic and predictable ways in which individuals make
ethical decisions and judge the ethical decisions of others.”52
These last two characterizations are important because they hint at the
central findings of the many studies conducted under the behavioral ethics
umbrella, ultimately leading us back toward our sound bite definition. That
is, research has found that “cognitive heuristics, psychological tendencies,
social and organizational pressures, and even seemingly irrelevant
situational factors can make it more likely that good people will do bad
things.”53 In plain terms, behavioral ethics research alerts us that while
most people are moral individuals intent on doing right, we are not as
ethical as we think we are.
Definitions aside for a moment, this last notion is key. Behavioral
ethics studies show that most people will make moral decisions in line with
their ethical beliefs, but because of cognitive obstacles, which may be
exacerbated by external factors, many people will be blind to their own
unethical conduct—they will engage in unethical acts without even
realizing it, acts that they would condemn upon further reflection.54 As one
leader in the field puts it, we are ethical, “but only boundedly so.”55 While
not exactly a perfect academic definition of the field, the insight is what
matters to those concerned with improving GRC.
2. The Decision-making Theory Underlying Behavioral Ethics
The central findings of behavioral ethics research provide a crucial
understanding of ethical decision-making, but the issue of how remains.
How does the ethical decision-making process operate so that it falls prey
to these cognitive obstacles, thereby placing limitations on our ethical
behavior?
For the answer, it is necessary to look outside the ethics field to
behavioral psychology. Here we find dual process theory, also called dual
thinking system theory—the concept that “human thought processes are
subserved by two distinct mechanisms.”56 The idea, which has been
(David De Cremer & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 2012).
52. Max H. Bazerman & Francesca Gino, Behavioral Ethics: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Moral Judgment and Dishonesty, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 85, 90
(2012).
53. Prentice, supra note 49, at 36.
54. See YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY
TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–4 (2018) (discussing psychological foundations of
behavioral ethics).
55. Prentice, supra note 49, at 36.
56. LAURI JÄRVILEHTO, THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF INTUITIVE THOUGHT AND
886 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 21:4
validated through numerous studies across disciplines, is considered one of
the great advancements in understanding how people make decisions when
facing uncertainty.57 Although dual process theory and its many offshoots
were developed through decades of work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky,58 which drew on the work of others before them,59 one of the best
summaries of the collective theory is provided by Jonathan Evans and
Keith Frankish:
These theories come in different forms, but all agree in positing
two distinct processing mechanisms for a given task, which
employ different procedures and may yield different, sometimes
conflicting, results. Typically, one of the processes is
characterized as fast, effortless, automatic, non-conscience,
inflexible, heavily contextualized, and undemanding of working
memory, and the other as slow, effortful, controlled, conscious,
flexible, decontextualized, and demanding of working memory.60
To flesh this out a bit, the fast process is generally referred to as
System 1. It is “evolutionally old, and shared with most higher animals.”61
It operates primarily by associative memory and intuition, and is therefore
governed by habit.62 It is also difficult to control or modify. System 1
works very quickly; the mind offers associations rapidly, one idea being
evoked after another, all linked effortlessly.63 The speed and ease in which
this thinking system operates means that “most of the work of associative
thinking is silent, hidden from our conscious selves.”64 This makes System
1 thinking not seem like thinking at all.
DECISIONMAKING 24 (2015) (internal citation omitted).
57. See, e.g., FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 2 (explaining that the concept of two systems
of reasoning is “at the core of extensive research in behavioral law and economics”).
58. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974) (exploring the extent to which individuals rely
on heuristics to simplify complex tasks into simpler judgment calls); Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263 (1979) (presenting a critique of traditional utility theory and offering an alternative
theory “in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in
which probabilities are replaced by decision weights”).
59. See, e.g., Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON.
99 (1955) (revising the definition of the “economic man” to take into account the
information and capacities a choosing organism realistically possesses).
60. IN TWOMINDS: DUAL PROCESSES AND BEYOND 1 (Jonathan St. B. T. Evans & Keith
Frankish eds., 2009).
61. JÄRVILEHTO, supra note 56, at 25.
62. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003) [hereinafter, Bounded Rationality].
63. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 52 (2011).
64. Id.
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In contrast is System 2. This is the slower reasoning process.65 It is
evolutionally recent, typical to humans and likely only the most advanced
primates.66 System 2 is “serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled,”
subject to logic and rules, and it is engaged whenever we use thought in an
organized manner.67 The effort that this type of thinking requires is
significant, but it is how the brain carefully addresses new tasks when there
are no easy associations to make. System 2 is able to engage in abstract
hypothetical thinking its counterpart cannot.68 Not surprisingly, this
reflective thinking system gives us the “experience of agency, autonomy,
and volition.”69 The features of each thinking system are shown in Table 1.
Based on these descriptions, most would view System 2 as superior to
System 1. But that is not entirely accurate. System 1 thinking is
associative and not constrained by working memory, which makes it
virtually effortless and therefore highly efficient.70 Indeed, System 1 is
uniquely suited for making the vast majority of our daily decisions,
everything from walking and talking to driving a car and brushing one’s
teeth, because it can process several streams of information all at once.
And, over time with enough practice, even complex decisions can become
65. JÄRVILEHTO, supra note 56, at 25.
66. Id.
67. Bounded Rationality, supra note 62, at 1451.
68. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 454 (2003).
69. Pelle Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Maaloe Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation
of Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour
Change in Public Policy, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 3, 13 (2013).
70. Evans, supra note 68, at 454.
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intuitive, falling under the System 1 process.71
But for most important decisions, particularly novel ones, System 2
thinking is the gold standard to ensure a thoughtful outcome. For example,
this is the system one would choose to solve a complex math problem,
write a poem, or contemplate pros and cons to make a difficult personal
decision.72 A difficulty arises, though, based on the greater cognitive load
required to employ System 2—it is easily overwhelmed.73 In fact, a person
fully engaging their System 2 process can only do so for a very short
time.74 This results in a series of cognitive limitations that “typically
manifest as the inability to focus attention.”75 The cause of these
limitations is that effortful mental processes disrupt each other, while
effortless ones do not. Thus, System 1 thinking tends to proliferate when
we are under significant cognitive load, which is anytime we are facing
non-routine decision, and System 2 thinking tends to narrow in scope.76
This last point is critically important to understanding ethical
decision-making. While most of us believe that we make decisions
carefully and deliberately, the behavioral research demonstrates that can
only be true for a small subset of decisions.77 That is because there is
simply not enough mental energy to give every decision the full reflection
it requires. So instead of making all or most of our decisions through
System 2, studies show that System 1 is dominant.78
We are left, then, with a thinking system compromise. At best,
System 2 can operate only as a watchful monitor, fully engaging when
important mental tasks arise or when it is needed to correct a System 1-
driven mental error.79 But like all monitoring systems, System 2 cannot
71. See Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 699 (2003) [hereinafter Perspective] (“System 1
generate[s] impressions of the attributes of objects of perception and thought . . . . The label
intuitive is applied to judgments that directly reflect impressions—they are not modified by
System 2.”).
72. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH,WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 20 (2008).
73. Id. at 457.
74. KAHNEMAN, supra note 63, at 31.
75. JÄRVILEHTO, supra note 56, at 26.
76. Id.
77. Bounded Rationality, supra note 62, at 1467.
78. See Bounded Rationality, supra note 62, at 1467 (“Judgments and choices are
normally intuitive, skilled, unproblematic, and reasonably successful.”); see generally
JONATHON HAIDT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS: FINDING MODERN TRUTH IN ANCIENT
WISDOM (2006) (using the image of a rider on an elephant to explain the relationship
between System 1 and 2 thinking. The rider is System 2, which tries to steer the more
powerful System 1 elephant under him, often unsuccessfully).
79. KAHNEMAN, supra note 63, at 44 (“One of the main functions of System 2 is to
monitor and control thoughts and actions ‘suggested’ by System 1, allowing some to be
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catch everything; some important decision tasks slip through the cracks.
These decisions might be made correctly by the automatic System 1, but
they also might be made by simple associative memory, with all its biases,
heuristics, and other mental shortcuts baked in. This is what causes us to
err in decision-making even when we know—or could figure out with little
effort—what is right.80
3. Dual System Thinking and Ethical Decision-making
Although dual system theory was developed independently of moral
decision-making, it has much to offer those trying to understand ethical
decisions and behavior. In fact, dual system theory serves as the
foundation for the central findings of behavioral ethics explained above—
that individual ethical decision-making is bounded, even when we intend to
behave ethically.81
No one has explored this subject quite so thoroughly as Yuval
Feldman. His exhaustive review of behavioral science research, including
that of behavioral psychology, behavioral economics, and behavioral
ethics, leads to two important conclusions. The first is that moral
judgments, a component of ethical decision-making, are made primary
through System 1.82 Citing the work of Jonathon Haidt, who is the leading
scholar in the area, Feldman explains that while there is a “contentious
debate still rag[ing],” it appears System 1 may undercut the thoughtful
System 2 consideration of moral judgments.83
The second conclusion is not so contested. Behavioral ethics
researchers have come to believe that self-interest is associated with the
automatic thinking system.84 This was first demonstrated in studies of
conflict of interest, which found that “self interest tends to operate via
automatic processes.”85 Additional studies show that a higher level of
cognitive control is necessary for ethical behavior—acting unethically is
much easier on “executive resources necessary to identify an act as
expressed directly in behavior and suppressing or modifying others.”).
80. KAHNEMAN, supra note 63, at 35–37.
81. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 33–35.
82. Id. at 44.
83. Id. (citing Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001) and Fiery
Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser, The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in
Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082 (2010)).
84. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 44 (citing Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-
Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189,
193 (2004)).
85. Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 84, at 195.
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immoral or unethical.”86 This is consistent with a host of studies
suggesting that when System 1 is activated, particularly do to cognitive
depletion or time pressures, people behave less ethically than they
otherwise would.87 Taking all the research together, it seems clear that we
“grant[] System 1 the leading role” when making ethical decisions, causing
us to initially “prefer outcomes that benefit ourselves.”88 In other words,
making unethical decisions, or at least ones that preference our own
wellbeing over others, is likely our default decision-making condition.
This is termed the “automaticity of self interest.”89
But as we know from dual system theory more generally, that is not
the end of the story. Once System 2 has been activated, prompting
thoughtful reflection, people often do “choose to behave in an ethically
appropriate manner.”90 Just as in other decision-making contexts,
behavioral ethics researchers have found that System 2 can act as a
watchful ethical monitor, jumping in to control the automatic self-interest
each of us possess.91 However, this monitoring function has significant
limits. It works best when cognitive load is low and individuals are able to
fully consider the ethical ramifications of a decision—these are the
conditions in which we are most likely to act consistent with our morals.92
When cognitive load is high, we become our less ethical selves.93
86. Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptation: How Self-Control Depletion
Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
191, 191 (2011).
87. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 45.
88. Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 8 (Eyal Zamir & Doron
Teichman eds., 2014); Minette Drumwright et al., Behavioral Ethics and Teaching Ethical
Decision Making, 13 DECISION SCI. J. INNOVATIVE EDUC. 431, 433 (2015); Nicholas Epley
& Eugene M. Caruso, Egocentric Ethics, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 171, 179 (2004).
89. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 3, 7 (calling the “automaticity of self-interest” one of
behavioral ethics’ basic tenets).
90. Id. at 8. But see David G. Rand et al., Spontaneous Giving and Calculated Greed,
489 NATURE 427 (2012) (finding that cooperation is intuitive and automatic, possibly
because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically
advantageous).
91. Bounded Rationality, supra note 62, at 1467.
92. Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 84, at 193.
93. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 8; Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 84, at 193.
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C. Rationalizations as the Link Between Unethical Decision-Making
and Unethical Behavior
The central findings of behavioral ethics, as well as the decision-
making science underlying it, has significant ramifications for companies
trying to predict and mitigate the conduct risk generated by its employees.
Increasing System 2 thinking related to ethical decisions would seem to be
an obvious path toward increasing GRC effectiveness. Unfortunately,
however, the story is a bit more complicated. That is because System 2
thinking itself is part of the cause of unethical and illegal acts in business.
To understand this, we have to turn to those researchers even more
steeped in the study of unethical behavior than behavioral ethicists:
criminologists. As far back as the 1940s, criminologists studying white
collar and organizational crime have theorized how offenders move from
unethical decision-making to unethical behavior.94
In his classic study of embezzlers, criminologist Donald Cressey
found that three conditions are necessary for an occupational crime to
occur. First, an individual must possess a non-shareable financial problem,
i.e., a problem the person feels cannot be solved by revealing it to others.95
Second, the individual must believe that the problem can be solved in
secret by violating a trust.96 Trust, of course, is essential to the operation of
all organizations—the entire principle-agent and employer-employee
relationship is built upon it.97 Third, the individual must verbalize the
relationship between the non-shareable problem and the unethical or illegal
solution in “language that lets him look on trust violation as something
other than trust violation.”98 Put another way, the individual conducts an
internal dialogue that “reasons” the trust violation as acceptable. The
paradigmatic example is a bank teller convincing himself that he is only
“borrowing” the embezzled funds and will pay them back.99 A more
modern example is suggesting it is alright to violate campaign laws because
94. See, e.g., Edwin H. Sutherland,White-Collar Criminality, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME,
AND SOCIAL PROCESS 349 (Donald R. Cressey & David A. Ward, eds. 1969) (including a
reprint of an article drafted in 1940 by Sutherland, who is considered the “Godfather” of
white collar crime, regarding causal theories of white-collar criminality).
95. See Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 14–15
(1965) (noting that while this sounds sophisticated, it usually is not; the problem could be
anything from gambling debts to business losses, anything that matters from “the
psychological perspective of the potential offender”).
96. MARKM. LANIER & STUART HENRY, ESSENTIAL CRIMINOLOGY 168 (3d ed. 2004).
97. JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 33–34 (2012).
98. Cressey, supra note 95, at 15.
99. Id.
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Behavioral ethics research suggests that we default toward unethical
decision-making, and therefore unethical action, because we are driven by
self-interested System 1 thinking.105 At the same time, criminological
research tells us that we come up with ways to convince ourselves—
consciously and subconsciously—that we are acting ethically.106 This is
System 2 thinking justifying our System 1 conclusions. Our supposed
watchful ethical monitor is not just asleep at the switch, but is actively
working against us—or, more accurately, working for our unethical selves.
Why exactly this occurs is unclear, but researchers suggest that we
have developed this mechanism to accommodate the countervailing aspects
of living in a “hypersocial” world, one that rewards self-interested behavior
but also social cooperation.107 The rationalization process redefines how
we look at our own behavior so as to square our self-perception as a “good
person” with the self-interested unethical or illegal behavior we are
contemplating.108 In a way, rationalizations trick the System 2 reflective
thinking process that would otherwise intervene to contain the
“automaticity of self interest.”109 This is not a product of intentional
amorality for most people; instead, they are blind to the “correction their
mind applies as it weighs ethical concerns against other motives.”110
D. The Spread of Unethical Behavioral within Organizations
The above suggests that companies trying to proactively use GRC
processes to lessen conduct risk are in a somewhat untenable position. If
the behavioral ethics and criminological research suggest that both System
1 and System 2 are feeding unethical decision-making and behavior,
companies would appear to be fighting an uphill battle against employee
wrongdoing and the risk it creates. Unfortunately, the picture gets worse
105. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 44.
106. Id. at 17; Cressey, supra note 95, at 15.
107. Elizabeth Kolbert, That’s What You Think: Why Reason and Evidence Won’t
Change Our Minds, THE NEW YORKER, at 66 (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds [https://perma.cc/JKB9-6KMT]
(citing HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON: A NEW THEORY OF
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2017)); see also Jonathon Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its
Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814,
818 (2001) (describing that moral reasoning is an effortful process, engaged in after a moral
judgment is made, in which a person searches for arguments that will support an already-
made judgment).
108. Vikas Anad et al., Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of
Corruption in Organizations, 18 ACAD.MGMT. EXECUTIVE 39, 40–43 (2004).
109. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 3, 7 (calling the “automaticity of self-interest” one of
behavioral ethics’ basic tenets).
110. BULGARELLA, supra note 39, at 7.
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before it gets better. That is because behavioral ethics research also
suggests that unethical behavior can spread easily within companies
through social and organizational networks, ratcheting up the conduct risk
companies face.
We have long known that social and organizational ties can have
significant impacts on ethical behavior.111 But only recently have we come
to understand the behavioral mechanisms behind those impacts. One group
of researchers coalescing around Francesca Gino has published a series of
studies addressing whether being exposed to the unethical behavior of
others to which you have an association increases dishonesty.112 Gino and
her colleagues found that student participants who observed fellow students
cheat on a task were much more likely to cheat themselves.113 Another
study found that when student participants felt “psychologically close” to
cheating students, the participants cheated in higher numbers themselves
and viewed selfish behavior as “less unethical or wrong.”114 Taken
together, these and other studies suggest that “people copy the behavior of
in-group members,” using that behavior to justify and rationalize their own
unethical conduct.115
These findings raise an obvious question, though: how
psychologically close must one be to those in-group members to have an
effect on ethicality? If psychological closeness is limited to familial
connections, for example, that may not have significant application in most
organizational settings. The answer, however, is that even scant
psychological closeness is enough to influence ethical decision making. In
the studies referenced above, the only thing the cheating students had in
common was seemingly attending the same college—they did not
personally know each other.116 Cheating rates increased when the study
participants observed a fellow student cheat who was simply wearing a t-
shirt with the same college logo as their own college.117 Even more
111. FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 48; Klebe Treviño et al., supra note 21, at 138–41.
112. Francesca Gino, Shahar Ayal & Dan Ariely, Contagion and Differentiation in
Unethical Behavior: The Effect of One Bad Apple on the Barrel, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 393
(2009); Francesca Gino & Adam D. Galinsky, Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological
Closeness Creates Distance from One’s Moral Compass, 119 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 15 (2012).
113. Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 396–97.
114. Gino & Galinsky, supra note 112, at 23.
115. Cilea Moore & Francesca Gino, Ethically Adrift: How Others Pull Our Moral
Compass from True North, and How We Can Fix It, 22 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 53,
57 (2013).
116. Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 396.
117. Id. ; see also Francesca Gino, Jun Gu & Chen-Bo Zhong, Contagion or Restitution?
When Bad Apples Can Motivate Ethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
1299, 1299–1300 (2009) (relating a similar experiment that tested selfish behavior).
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striking, trivial similarities such as sharing a birthday can create the same
closeness that leads to increased unethicality.118 This suggests a close co-
worker relationship, or even just employment by the same company, could
similarly impact ethical decision-making.119
Such insights into how social dimensions impact ethical decision-
making take on special significance when considering the networks—social
and organizational—that exist within companies. If close connections and
in-group dynamics influence unethical behavior, that means employees
who are joined by psychological closeness, even if it is very slight, may be
more prone to commit violations of laws or norms when others around
them are doing so.120 And when these individuals are linked together in a
network, the number and harm of those violations increases.121 In other
words, individual wrongdoing can be “contagious,” spreading quickly
through an organizational network in unexpected ways.122
Sociologist and network theorist Mark Granovetter’s study of how
riots occur supports this proposition. Granovetter posited that potential
rioters—the persons in a crowd milling around and witnessing the group’s
actions—have a “threshold” for joining.123 This threshold differs for each
participant based on their own ethical decision-making, i.e., the level at
which their mind allows potential bad behavior to be operationalized.
Granovetter created a model that assigned 100 potential rioters a number
from 0 to 99, which corresponded to their individual thresholds—the
person with the zero threshold would begin rioting all on his own, the
person with the 1 threshold would see one person rioting and join in, on
and on until the last person joined.124 This model suggested that riots
would “grow like wildfire, eventually sucking in even people with very
high [individual] thresholds.”125 But the model also suggested that if just
118. Gino & Galinsky, supra note 112, at 23–24.
119. This is consistent with research indicating two people reviewing a transaction, the
so-called four-eyes principle, may not be any more beneficial than a single person audit.
See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Preventing Corruption by Promoting Trust: Insights from
Behavioral Science 1, 5 (Univ. of Passau, Faculty of Bus. and Econ., Working Paper No. V-
69-15, 2015), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/125558 [https://perma.cc/F2GC-WZBL].
120. Gino & Galinsky, supra note 112, at 23; see also, Kristin Smith-Crowe & Danielle
E. Warren, The Emotion-Evoked Collective Corruption Model: The Role of Emotion in the
Spread of Corruption Within Organizations, 25 ORG. SCI. 1124, 1165 (2014) (providing a
model showing how corruption might spread through emotion even to well intentioned and
morally engaged population).
121. Gino & Galinsky, supra note 112, at 23.
122. Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 398.
123. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 J. SOC. 1420, 1422
(1978).
124. Id.
125. MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF
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one person early on had a slightly higher threshold, say a 6 instead of a 4,
the riot would end before it gained momentum because the next threshold
would never be reached.
This simple model led Granovetter to better understand actual riot
behavior, in which the “equilibrium number of rioters” does not build
uniformly, but rather appears to jump up drastically at a certain point.126
He found that riot size increased by a factor of seven—an explosion more
than a wildfire—after crossing a seemingly arbitrary point.127 Granovetter
suggested that this phenomenon was caused by the relationships between
the active and potential rioters; he believed friendships were lowering
individual thresholds to joining the riot. Accordingly, if some number of
people in the crowd were friends with those rioting, the overall riot
participants would skyrocket along with the harm caused. Granovetter
called this the “bandwagon” effect.128
This finding is consistent with the behavioral ethics research on
psychological closeness. Granovetter’s modeling shows how individual
ethical decision-making, as influenced by personal relationships, creates
significant and oftentimes unexpected conduct risk.129 When there is an in-
group relationship creating psychological closeness between a wrongdoer
and others in the group, the others’ thresholds to unethical behavior are
lowered. And if one or more of the wrongdoers is an important part of a
network of related individuals—they are the center of the group, so to
speak—they possess an outsized ability to lower many individual
thresholds all at once. This spreads bad behavior in an unpredictable and
highly volatile manner—it becomes contagious and explodes because of
the bandwagon effect. Thus, a company’s social and organizational
network—and who within it is making unethical decisions and committing
unethical acts—can greatly impact the ethicality of the entire
organization.130 This is how a few unethical decisions by key individuals
can translate into systemic behavioral ethics risk for a company.
Consider the story of Hacienda. Investigations of the company
indicate that key decision-makers had been engaged in unethical, and
possibly illegal, behavior for years. The longtime CEO “had been accused
of sexual harassment numerous times by employees since 2006.”131 Yet he
NETWORKS 107 (2002).
126. Granovetter, supra note 123, at 1428.
127. Id. at 1425.
128. Id. at 1429 (describing two factors that have a role in changing the effects of
threshold distributions, including “social structure”).
129. Id.
130. See Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 397 (suggesting unethical behaviors
such as cheating, stealing, and dishonesty are “contagious” within business organizations).
131. Kelly, supra note 4.
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remained in the position until the patient assault. At the same time,
Hacienda’s board chairman appears to have allowed conflicts of interest to
go unchecked for years. For example, he “brokered health insurance for
roughly 800 Hacienda employees through his private company for decades,
reaping lucrative commissions on the contracts.”132 In addition, at least
four children of board members were hired by the company, some in
managerial and senior executive roles.133
While these practices may not be illegal, they are certainly unethical.
As unethical decisions are made in an organization, especially by leaders
who come into contact with and influence all employees in the
organization’s network, unethicality spreads because the thresholds for
wrongdoing are lessened. It is easier for everyone to rationalize their
questionable behavior. This does not mean the chairman and CEO are
directly responsible for the patient assault, but it does explain how an
organization ostensibly focused on patient care could create an
atmosphere—a culture—allowing it to happen. If those in charge do not
appear to care about putting patient care above their own interests, why
would a group of hospital staff? And as staff see each other engage in
unethical behavior, the thresholds for doing wrong decrease. In this way,
the unchecked automaticity of self-interest by one group creates conduct
risk for another—risk that ultimately can overcome whatever GRC
functions are in place. At Hacienda, this allowed a terrible injury to a
helpless woman.
II. BEHAVIORAL ETHICS RISK: MANAGING A NEW PARADIGM
The above offers a more accurate—and arguably more challenging—
paradigm of GRC, one that is organized around individual unethical
decision-making and how it may spread in an organization. This Article
suggests it is a significant cause of compliance failures and an important
driver of conduct risk facing companies, which highlights the question
posed at the outset: how can business leaders and compliance professionals
prospectively manage this newly identified risk? How can we prevent bad
things from happening at Hacienda or any other company?
The short answer is that behavioral ethics risk can be managed
through the same means by which it originates. By understanding,
132. Robert Anglen, Rape at Health-Care Facility Reveals Questionable Deals,
Nepotism by Board Leaders, AZCENTRAL (Feb. 19, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.azcentral.c
om/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2019/02/19/hacienda-healthcare-board-where-
patient-raped-history-questionable-deals-nepotism-thomas-pomeroy/2864358002/ [https://p
erma.cc/YP2F-2AKP].
133. Id.
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targeting, and even harnessing the ethical decision-making processes
occurring at the individual employee level, companies can increase
compliance and build ethical culture. That is to say, they can increase GRC
effectiveness from the inside-out, helping employees understand and adapt
their own ethical decision-making to foster positive behavior. As
individual ethical transgressions are lessened, so is the spread of bad
conduct, allowing ethical culture to grow organically within the
organization—all of which lessens behavioral ethics risk. While there are
no quick fixes, the following offers a series of behavioral practices that
companies can employ as part of their GRC efforts.
A. Assessing Individual Employees’ Behavioral Ethics Risk
Companies can begin managing behavioral ethics risk at the hiring
process. This occurs through two different, yet related methods. The first
is by screening for conduct risk.134 Most companies use educational
background, employment history, and in-person interviews to select
candidates, and then screen for past bankruptcies or criminal violations as a
final check. But this does little to identify all but the most egregious
wrongdoers, and the common metrics are highly imperfect indicators of
future unethical decision-making.
Instead, companies can explicitly screen for propensity to make
ethical decisions. For example, prospective or probationary employees can
be asked to take the Defining Issues Test, which questions respondents on
how they would address a series of moral vignettes, providing an ethicality
assessment based on the principle of justice.135 Another assessment, the
Mach IV, determines a person’s propensity toward Machiavellian-type
behavior, or the lack of concern with conventional morality.136 And a third,
the Cognitive Reflection Test, measures how likely someone is to fall prey
to “impulsive erroneous responses” that may signal a lack of System 2
thinking.137 These diagnostic tools have been around for years and are well
validated; yet they have not been widely used in business to identify
conduct risk.
In addition, researchers have recently developed a test to measure rule
134. For a general discussion of misconduct risk as it relates to the financial crisis, see
Christina P. Skinner,Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559 (2016).
135. Kelly Richmond Pope, Measuring the Ethical Propensity of Accounting Students:
Mach IV Versus DIT, 3 J. ACAD. ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2005).
136. Id. at 90.
137. Shane Fredrick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
27 (2005).
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orientation.138 This tool may be particularly useful for companies because
it assesses how an individual considers rules—whether rules should be
followed in a rigid manner or are subject to exception.139 In other words,
there is now a diagnostic that measures our feelings about rules and our
propensity to rationalize rule breaking—essentially, what a person’s
threshold to unethical or illegal behavior might be.140 While companies
must be careful how they collect and use diagnostic information, these
assessments offer a baseline of individual behavioral ethics risk, a critical
compliance metric under this new GRC paradigm.141
The second method to begin managing behavioral ethics risk at the
hiring stage relates to framing. Framing is relatively well-understood at
this point, i.e., that how something is described impacts its perceived
value.142 According to the research, when people contemplate an uncertain
risk, they are heavily influenced by the frame in which that decision is
made.143 For example, framing a decision as one that may cause loss means
it will be chosen less than one framing the same decision as causing a type
of gain.144
Goldman Sachs uses framing, and a good bit of fear-driven aversion to
loss, to set the tone for ethical decision-making and culture at the firm.
Goldman invites its analyst interns seeking full-time employment to attend
a rigorous training and orientation program.145 Firm personnel warn the
138. See Adam Fine et al., Rule Orientation and Behavior: Development and Validation
of a Scale Measuring Individual Acceptance of Rule Violation, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 314, 323 (2016) (employing a scale measuring tool to predict law violation).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 315.
141. See FELDMAN, supra note 54, at 136 (describing Walmart’s use of a screening test
for new hires that predicts discriminatory behavior).
142. The most readily understood type of framing is called “attribute framing,” when “a
product or option is described using a positive or negative attribute label.” Chris
Janiszewski, Tim Silk & Alan D. J. Cooke, Different Scales for Different Frames: The Role
of Subjective Scales and Experience in Explaining Attribute-Framing Effects, 30 J.
CONSUMER RES. 311, 312 (2003).
143. KAHNEMAN, supra note 63, at 364.
144. Id. at 364–66. A good example of this is the following: If you were suffering from
a serious health condition and trying to determine whether you would agree to a treatment,
your doctor might say, “Of one hundred patients who have this condition, ninety are alive in
five years.” That would make you feel pretty good about the odds, and you would be much
more likely to move forward with the treatment. But, if the doctor said, “Of one hundred
patients who have this condition, ten are dead after five years,” you would not. It is the
same objective information, so a rational decision maker should not be influenced
differently. Yet they are because framing the decision around death creates a negative
reference, which the automatic System 1 judges the decision against. See also THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 36–37 (describing framing effects and providing numerous
examples).
145. Julia La Roche, This Is How the Goldman Sachs Analysts Who Got Fired Were
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analysts repeatedly that cheating on skills tests is not tolerated.146 In one
test, which is not particularly difficult, interns are told they cannot conduct
outside research, yet they are given access to computers with Internet
connections.147 This sets up a clear test of whether an intern’s watchful
monitor can govern the obvious advantages of unethical behavior, the type
that could be easily rationalized away. Recently, Goldman dismissed
twenty interns from its program for Googling answers.148 Dismissing the
violators not only eliminated future conduct risk emanating from the rule
violators, but it also helped establish the proper ethical frame—building a
culture of honesty is paramount at the firm and a great loss will occur to
those who ignore firm values for short-term gain.149
B. Identifying and Monitoring Employees Posing Heightened
Behavioral Ethics Risk
Once an employee joins a company, efforts should be directed at
identifying and monitoring problematic ethical decision-making.
Companies should start by identifying those individuals in the company’s
network who possess outsized ethical influence. These are the employees
that, by virtue of their position in the company’s social or organizational
hierarchy, “tie an entire . . . [organizational] network together.”150 As
explained above, these employees have the ability to generate significant
conduct risk and spread it throughout the firm.151
How are these employees identified? The company’s organizational
chart is a useful starting point because it provides a sense of professional
reach, but it only goes so far in showing ethical influence. For example, as
seen with the recent Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal, the CEO was not
the origin or driver of the unethical behavior.152 The true influencers at the
Cheating, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-an
alysts-fired-for-cheating-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/BK9Z-CWUA].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See John C. Hollwitz & Donna R. Pawlowski, The Development of a Structured
Ethical Integrity Interview for Pre-Employment Screening, 34 J. BUS. COMM. 203, 214–16
(1997) (outlining procedures for structured pre-employment ethics interviews).
150. BUCHANAN, supra note 125, at 114.
151. Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 397.
152. See INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY SALES
PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT 50 (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com
/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR
64-HL66] (outlining the factors that culminated in the fake account scandal). This is true of
a number of corporate scandals. See e.g., Peter Eavis, How Much Could the 1MDB Scandal
Cost Goldman Sachs?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/09/bu
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bank were a few regional managers connected to the head of the
community banking division; they were the “hubs” of the network through
which behavioral compliance risk spread.153 Accordingly, compliance
personnel need to identify those in the company who are the true catalysts
of potentially unethical behavior. While most discussions of corporate
culture focus on “tone at the top,” that may not be where significant
behavioral ethics risk lies.154
But sometimes it is. That would very much appear to be the case at
Hacienda, where both the CEO and a key board member were engaged in
unethicality. When this is the case, it is very difficult for conduct risk to be
lessened and GRC practices improved. That is because every message
concerning culture and compliance from leadership is at odds with what
others at the company know: that the rhetoric is meaningless. This feeling
breeds System 2 rationalizations, particularly ones focused on relative
acceptability or normality.155 Only the terrible harm to a patient and the
extreme outside scrutiny appear to have caused the other board members to
reevaluate their acquiescence to the CEO and his contemporaries.156
But such behavioral risk was also likely present in smaller pockets at
Hacienda. Otherwise, how is it that a team of caretakers, security
personnel, and other staff could so blatantly fail in their roles? Each of the
employees having contact with the patient had a supervisor, team leader, or
co-worker who set the norms of conduct in their various spheres. If those
people were making unethical decisions—and it appears they were, given
that properly caring for the incapacitated is an ethics-laden act—then that
conduct could easily spread. It likely became the norm at Hacienda to go
through the motions with regard to patient care, allowing the automaticity
of self-interest to take precedent over the interests of others.
Once it is determined who in the organization is an ethical influencer,
siness/dealbook/goldman-1mdb-penalties.html [https://perma.cc/T3FZ-D5SZ] (indicating
that the bribery scandal is likely localized to a few, powerful players within the bank tied to
a single Malaysian financer).
153. BUCHANAN, supra note 125, at 85.
154. See, e.g., Hon. Patti B. Smith, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Remarks at the
Twelfth Annual Compliance and Ethics Inst. (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/defa
ult/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/special-reports/saris-remarks-annual-
compliance-and-ethics-institute.pdf [https://perma.cc/69YM-49B2] (“[T]he guidelines
emphasize the importance of a ‘tone from the top’ and the need for internal corporate
monitoring and auditing as a means of deterring organizational crime.”); Benjamin van
Rooij & Adam Fine, Toxic Corporate Culture: Assessing Organizational Processes of
Deviancy, 8 ADMIN. SCI. [1], [27] (2018) (“Toxic culture [is] not just a matter of one bad
CEO, one bad set of incentives, or the tone at the top. Certainly, the fish can rot from the
head, but that certainly is not the only way it rots.”).
155. Criminalization, supra note 6, at 1258.
156. See Kelly, supra note 4 (describing board member resignations).
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they should be assessed for individual behavioral compliance risk. The
diagnostic tools discussed earlier are a good start, but assessing risk is
dynamic and multifaceted. Fortunately, conducting risk assessments as
part of the GRC function is familiar to most companies.157 However,
companies must keep in mind that they are trying to identify ethical
decision-making risk, not the more familiar business process and enterprise
risk.158
One company taking the correct approach is Morgan Stanley, who
now asks its risk and compliance officers to evaluate “material risk-
takers.”159 For example, a trader that frequently hits trading limits, misses
compliance trainings, or fails to take mandatory holidays imposed to
uncover fraud would raise concern. Once identified, such an employee
would be monitored for risk-taking behavior, and how they managed it
would factor into promotion and compensation decisions. This could lead
to bonus reductions or even termination for cause.160
Companies that routinely deal with safety concerns, such as those in
the manufacturing space, can also provide positive examples. For instance,
Alcoa in Russia was able to change its entire culture, including that of
bribery and corruption, by focusing on improvements in safety at its
aluminum stamping plants.161 Once key employees understood that the
company was serious about improving their lives by making sure that they
would return home safely each day—in part by more heavily monitoring
and then dismissing chronically unsafe workers—those employees adopted
a culture of rule following.162
Ideally, however, a behavioral risk evaluation would consider many
other factors that impact ethical decision-making, and do so more
prospectively. Behavioral ethics research has demonstrated that factors
related to stress and depleted mental resources cause ethical decision-
making shortcuts, so assessments should consider if employees are under
such strain—caused either by personal issues or company pressures.163
157. See Robert C. Bird & Stephan Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 285 (2017) (discussing corporate approaches
to identifying legal, regulatory, and compliance risk).
158. Id.
159. Olivia Oran, Wells Fargo Scandal Reignites Debate about Big Bank Culture,
REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-accounts-culture-
analysis/wells-fargo-scandal-reignites-debate-about-big-bank-culture-idUSKCN11Y1S1 [htt
ps://perma.cc/953C-N4U8].
160. Id.
161. BRAD AGLE, AARON MILLER & BILL O’ROURKE, THE BUSINESS ETHICS FIELD GUIDE
162–64 (2016).
162. Id.
163. See Francesca Gino et al., Unable to Resist Temptations: How Self-Control
Depletion Promotes Unethical Behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
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Another evaluative tool is to identify employees who regularly rationalize.
While this may be more difficult to objectively monitor, one way to assess
the propensity to rationalize is to hold employee roundtables in which rule
breaking and ethical dilemmas are discussed. Fairly quickly, employees
will offer a host of rationalizations justifying various behaviors. Parsons,
an international engineering company, hosts an internal website where it
poses hypothetical ethics problems and asks employees to vote on how they
should be resolved; the responses indicate what rationalizations are being
employed by individuals and groups.164 Finally, although counterintuitive,
employees engaged in creative tasks are at heightened ethical risk.165
Compliance personnel should assess business units and job categories
where creativity is expected and add that to the behavioral risk assessment
schedule. Specific behavioral risk factors will vary depending on an
individual’s place in an industry, a company, a business unit, and a sub-
group—and will change over time—but thoughtful compliance
professionals should be able to craft a behavioral risk matrix that considers
many of these factors.166
For the employees who do exhibit heightened behavioral ethics risk,
and even more so for those that are also ethical influencers, the company
should allocate disproportionate compliance resources toward them. Such
employees should receive more training, more monitoring, and be subject
to more investigative inquiries. Put bluntly, compliance officers should be
on a first-name basis with these employees. In addition, compliance tools
should be tailored to these high-risk employees. Although it is framed as a
management practice, global equipment and engineering consulting firm
Barry-Wehmiller provides individualized ethics and compliance
programing to its employees.167 The company’s CEO meets with each
employee to understand their values, interests, goals, and personal and
professional challenges. Employees are then slotted into an appropriate
level of the firm’s ethical leadership training curriculum.168
PROCESSES 191 (2001) (finding that those without self-control resources were less likely to
behave honestly). This, of course, requires companies to be introspective and honest about
the pressures and incentives it is placing on employees.
164. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 983 (2012).
165. Francesca Gino & Dan Ariely, The Dark Side of Creativity: Original Thinkers Can
Be More Dishonest, 102 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 445 (2012).
166. See ROGER MILES, CONDUCT RISK MANAGEMENT: USING A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
TO PROTECT YOUR BOARD AND FINANCIAL SERVICES BUSINESS 37, 161 (2015) (explaining
reference points that inform risk profile and listing five factors that increase conduct risk).
167. See BOB CHAPMAN & RAJ SISODIA, EVERYBODY MATTERS: THE EXTRAORDINARY
POWER OF CARING FOR YOUR PEOPLE LIKE FAMILY 213–23 (2015) (explaining a company’s
employee-centered approach to business).
168. Id.
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C. Mitigating Behavioral Ethics Risk
Regardless of an employee’s ethical risk profile, every company’s
compliance program should be looking for opportunities to increase the
ethical decision-making and behavior of its employees, officers, and
directors. While most companies’ programs attempt to educate and train
employees on legal doctrines and company rules, this ignores the System 1
process that dominates ethical decision-making. It is simply unrealistic to
expect employees to memorize a litany of complex rules, identify when
those rules apply in complex and fast moving factual situations, and then
harness their reflective thinking system to properly follow them. Not to
mention also guarding against System 2 motivated reasoning.
A more fruitful approach is to aim compliance interventions at the
inflection points where decision-making becomes behavior. Not only is
this approach more consistent with behavioral theory, it recognizes the
practicalities of “what actually happens” with employee thinking.169 The
idea is that companies must “frame [their] training around . . . specific,
risky job tasks” to ensure unethical employee decision-making is properly
targeted.170 Doing otherwise “pushes all of the ‘transfer’ work to the
employee,” and transfer is the critical step in the application of learned
knowledge.171
This can be done in simple and more complex ways. For example, a
company could create a series of checklists that are task specific and
directed at employee action. Broadcat, a startup compliance provider, has
one called “Going Oversees On a Business Trip?” that contains check
boxes for things such as getting company preapprovals for gifts and
entertainment, securing computer files before travel, and carrying an ethics
helpline phone number.172 Although the checklist is simple and easy to
understand, it is grounded in sophisticated behavioral science—it is a
“precommitment device” for avoiding conduct risk. By committing to the
company’s antibribery provisions, and then being reminded of them while
undertaking the task of overseas travel, employees are less likely to engage
in risk-creating behavior when the temptation is highest.
On the more sophisticated side, JPMorgan uses proprietary software to
monitor the email and telephone communications of its traders to ensure
169. MILES, supra note 166, at 63.
170. RICARDO PELLAFONE, KEEPING COMPLIANCE SIMPLE 11, http://complianceandethics.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Keeping-Compliance-Simple-Broadcat.pdf [https://perma.
cc/6W53-G98D].
171. Id.; see also SUSAN AMBROSE ET AL., HOW LEARNING WORKS: 7 RESEARCH-BASED
PRINCIPLES FOR SMART TEACHING (2010) (outlining seven different principles of teaching).
172. Id.
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they “adhere to ‘personal trading rules’ and risk limits.”173 While this type
of monitoring has been part of corporate compliance and risk management
for years, JPMorgan’s efforts are noteworthy because the bank’s software
algorithms attempt to predict unethical or illegal trading behavior and stop
it before it occurs. Such “predictive monitoring” uses a series of alerts to
nudge traders, and alert compliance staff, if they are about to violate a
company or legal rule.174
Similarly, Starling Trust Services, another compliance-oriented startup
focusing on the financial services sector, merges behavioral science,
network theory, and machine learning to better understand and target
organizational behavioral risk. By using the metadata of employee
communications, Starling is able to identify groups of influence within a
company and then build models of trust relationships based on that
information.175 From this, they can predict when trust is eroding in an
organization, which may signal future unethical decision-making. And
now, they are developing nudging technology to harness System 1 and 2
decision-making to combat the likely behavior proactively.176
Finally, not all behavioral ethics risk management strategies are aimed
at stopping unethical behavior. Just as important is how a company fosters
the ethical acts of its employees. Research shows that compliance and risk
management messaging is more effective when it demonstrates that ethical
behaviors are widely engaged in and supported in the organization.177 The
reason is likely related to how individuals rationalize their conduct.
Positive compliance messaging of this type combats the notion that ethical
decision-making is an isolated act, therefore to commit bad behavior is
173. Portia Crowe, JP Morgan Is Working on a New Employee Surveillance Program,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/jpmorgans-employee-surve
illance-program-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/FY9R-3J43].
174. Hugh Son, JP Morgan Algorithm Knows You’re a Rogue Employee Before You Do,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/jpmorga
n-algorithm-knows-you-re-a-rogue-employee-before-you-do [https://perma.cc/S3P7-92MT].
175. Henry Engler, Bank Culture Forum: Big Banks Gain More Understanding of Staff
Conduct, REUTERS (April 24, 2018, 8:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-ba
nk-culture-forum-understandi/bank-culture-forum-big-banks-gain-more-understanding-of-st
aff-conduct-lack-common-standards-idUSKBN1HV27P [https://perma.cc/QS84-GD8G].
176. Id.; see also Julie DiMauro, How to Find and Fix Behavioral ‘Hot Spots,’ THE
FCPABLOG (Jan. 18, 2019, 8:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2019/1/18/how-to-fin
d-and-fix-behavioral-hot-spots.html [https://perma.cc/4FRF-B85Z] (explaining similar
programs, albeit less high tech, at the Dutch National Bank and the Royal Bank of
Scotland).
177. See Robert B. Cialdini et al.,Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SOC.
INFLUENCE 3, 11–12 (2006); Lynn S. Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72
HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 111 (1994) (explaining that “[e]mployees may rebel against programs
that stress penalties” and view compliance programs that do not address root causes of
misconduct skeptically).
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somehow normal.178 That means companies need to share genuine stories
of their ethics and compliance successes, conveying the message that the
majority of the company is committed to making ethical decisions.
One way to do so that takes advantage of network theory is to
leverage ethical employees who are hubs of influence as “compliance
ambassadors.” This can take many forms. One is that these employees can
be asked to identify gaps in compliance and “bring those issues back to
HQ, with suggestions on how to fix them.”179 This not only helps
compliance officers who cannot anticipate every possible compliance risk,
but it also strengthens in-group ethical behavior.180 Another behavioral
focused approach is to ask these ambassadors to simply talk about ethics
and compliance with their co-workers, including temptations and pressures
that may cause ethical decision-making lapses. When System 1 biases and
heuristics or System 2 rationalizations arise, they should be drawn out and
explored. The goal is for the ambassador, possibly with the help of
compliance personnel, to raise “conscious awareness [of] certain patterns
of self-exculpatory reasoning, and to flag them as suspicious.”181 That way,
employees will be less likely to use bounded ethical decision-making in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article has been to outline key insights from research
in behavioral ethics, criminology, and network theory to provide a new
paradigm through which to harmonize corporate governance, risk
management, and compliance. By focusing on the core driver of
compliance failures—individual unethical decision-making—the GRC
functions at companies can be better understood and improved upon. A
behavioral ethics risk management approach is best positioned to achieve
the overarching goal of all companies’ GRC efforts—the reduction of
conduct risk to allow for more efficient and effective business operation.
Events like those that occurred at Hacienda Healthcare demonstrate the
importance of making lasting improvements in this area.
178. See JAMES WILLIAM COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE 197 (5th ed. 2002) (describing
the claim of relative acceptability/normality rationalization).
179. Richard Bistrong, Are Your Sales Teams Compliance Ambassadors?, THE
FCPABLOG (Feb. 24, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/2/24/richard-bis
trong-are-your-sales-teams-compliance-ambassadors.html [https://perma.cc/QS84-GD8G].
180. Linda Klebe Treviño et al., (Un)ethical Behavior in Organizations, 65 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 635, 643 (2014); Gino, Ayal & Ariely, supra note 112, at 393.
181. Joseph Heath, Business Ethics and Moral Motivation: A Criminological
Perspective, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 595, 611 (2008).
